The author addresses the question of how to use value-learning processes to integrate corporate social responsibility (CSR) in organizations as an interesting challenge in (higher) education. Two strategies have been proposed for the issue of CSR: a compliance strategy and a cultural change strategy (Karssing, 2001). This article focuses on the ethical and philosophical presuppositions of these different approaches. The incorporation of CSR in organizations cannot be accomplished by means of a compliance strategy only. Rather, it needs to be supplemented (...) by a strategy aimed at stimulating a transformation process on the corporate culture level. The perspective of change through dialogue is proposed as a means of innovating the curriculum and the primary processes of student education. This organizational change perspective is demonstrated by describing how (ethical) reflective aspects are integrated in the curriculum of the Free University of Amsterdam. An additional case study on organizational value learning is presented to illustrate the thesis that CSR presupposes that university is an adequate context where life-long learning begins. (shrink)

An excellent collection of lectures. The collection consists of the following: Carl C. Hempel, "On the Structure of Scientific Theories"; W. V. Quine, "Stimulus and Meaning"; Stuart Hampshire, "Aesthetic as the Middle Ground"; H. D. Aiken, "On the Concept of a Moral Principle"; J. O. Urmson, "Utilitarianism"; John Wild, "Is There an Existential A Priori?"; Aron Gurwitsch, "The Husserlian Conception of the Intentionality of Consciousness"; Quentin Lauer, "The Phenomenon of Reason"; and Walter Kaufmann, "The Riddle of Oedipus: Tragedy and Philosophy." (...) These essays represent original contributions to philosophy of science, ethics, and phenomenology and existentialism.--A. S. C. (shrink)

These two small works are a good supplement to Rescher’s recent trilogy. Whereas the systems-theoretic approach is employed in Methodological Pragmatism in dealing with the problem of the legitimation of claims to factual knowledge or cognitive rationality, Dialectics deals with the argumentation aspect of thesis-introduction rather than the logical aspect of thesis-derivation. Although some key notions such as the idea of burden of proof and presumption have been stated in the former work, what is offered here is a systematic discussion (...) of a disputational model of inquiry. The principal aims are "to exhibit the sociocommunal roots of the foundations of rationality, to provide an instrument for the critique of scepticism implicit in the cognitive solipsism of the Cartesian approach, and to illuminate the communal and controversy-oriented aspects of rational argumentation and inquiry—scientific inquiry in particular." Again, Rescher limits his discussion to "the probative mechanism in the factual domain." This book, if it were not for its price, should be a good supplement to a course in "informal" logic which focuses on argumentation rather than on mere evaluation of arguments. Plausible Reasoning provides the mechanism for evaluation of plausibility claims as distinct from probabilistic ones. The basic differences between these two types of claims are clearly discussed. "Plausibility is essentially a classificatory concept which ranks theses in terms of the standing and solidity of their cognitive basis. Plausibility grades theses by an external or extrinsic standard of the hierarchical nature of their supporting bases. It classifies propositions by the status of the evidential sources or validating principles that vouch for them. Probability weighs alternatives and evaluates theses by this relative contentual weight of the supporting considerations."—A.S.C. (shrink)

These essays "develop in a more ample and emphatic form the pragmatic perspective of the idealistic position" defended in previous books. The basic question deals with validating the criterion employed in the practice of determining factual truth. The pragmatic thesis is defended along the criterial rather than propositional line. Criterial pragmatism asserts "that a proposition is to be accepted if it conforms to an epistemologically warranted criterion, and that a criterion is warranted if its adoption as a principle of propositional (...) acceptance is maximally success-promoting." It is concerned with validating methodology rather than establishing substantive theses or validating specific criteria for factual knowledge. "Since the rational espousal of a factual truth must be governed by some appropriate criterion of acceptance, and any such criterion is in effect methodological, it follows that in the factual domain practical reason is basic to the theoretical.". (shrink)

For scholars of American philosophy, this anthology of essays on S. C. Pepper's works on metaphysics, aesthetics, and value theory is especially a welcome one. Also included is a reprint of a little known but valuable essay by Pepper entitled "Metaphor in Philosophy," which originally appeared in volume 3 of Phillip S. Wiener's Dictionary of the History of Ideas. In this essay, Pepper discusses his root metaphor theory in relation to Bacon and Kant, and some contemporary uses of the notion (...) of paradigm, e.g., Wittgenstein and Kuhn. Lewis E. Hahn's "The Stephen C. Pepper Papers, 1903-1972" gives an informative account of six book-length unpublished manuscripts in the Pepper Archives at the Southern Illinois University. The rest of the essays concentrate on the various aspects of Pepper's works. A few deal with aesthetic theory and its application to critical practice. Of philosophical interests are papers by Elmer H. Duncan, David B. Richardson, Robert J. Yanal, Robert L. Armstrong, and Brian Caraher, and a short essay by Charles Hartshorne and a response by Joseph H. Monast. Duncan gives a just but critical account of the neglect of Pepper's Sources of Value, and a highly appreciative appraisal of Pepper's World Hypotheses. Caraher's careful essay on the conflicting root metaphors in Frege's theory of meaning offers interesting application of Pepper's conception of formism and contextualism to problems in Frege's philosophy. A variety of problems such as the root metaphor theory, descriptive definition and aesthetic experience are discussed. Efron's long introductory essay entitled "Pepper's Continuing Value" serves its purpose well in terms of indicating Pepper's influence in non-philosophical disciplines and the problems that arise in Pepper's value theory. What is missed is a sustained critical examination of Pepper's root metaphor theory, characterization of the various world hypotheses including Pepper's own selectivism, and its relation to ethical theory. The anthology however is useful in indicating the scope of Pepper's influence and the need to examine his contributions with reference to contemporary philosophical problems.--A.S.C. (shrink)

A lucidly written and original contribution to the study of the concept of expression. "The aim has been to construct an analysis from the examination of typical forms of human expressions and from the logical implications of our description of such expressions." An interesting theory emerges from such an analysis in Chapters I and II. The theory is "extended to language in Chapter III and to art in Chapters IV and V." Chapter I deals with behavior and expression and plausibly (...) argues for the thesis that intentionality is characteristic of expressible states of the person and that these expressions are "noncontingently connected with behavioral patterns associated with them." Chapter II takes up the topic of inference. It begins with the distinction between "Ø-expression" and "expression of Ø." The former is claimed to be a "description of certain observable features of a situation;" and the latter is an "inference warranting expression, relating some intentional state of a person to particular aspects of his observable behavior." It is argued that the nature of warrantable inference is non-causal, but "one which moves from a part of a conceptual complex to another part, or to the whole of it." Chapter III contains a good discussion of the distinction between belief and opinion, expressive and performative uses of language. The chapter concludes with the statement that "linguistic expression, like its behavioral counterpart, preserves an inferential connection with intentional states of the person." The last two chapters deal with art as expression. The appendix contains quotations from prominent expression theorists. A useful bibliography is also provided.--A. S. C. (shrink)

This new addition to the series New Studies in Practical Philosophy edited by W. D. Hudson is a study of deontic moral judgment, in particular of moral concepts which embody standards for the assessment of claims to right or wrong actions. Three main theses are quite clearly stated. The first thesis concerns the distinctive character of the moral point of view which is irreducible to either logical or factual considerations. The second thesis is that moral judgments claim interpersonal validity in (...) the sense that the speaker makes the implicit claim that every reflective agent who considers the judgment "ought to agree" with the judgment as a correct one. The third thesis pertains to the moral disagreement. It is maintained that moral disagreements are "in principle" decidable, not by way of deductive subsumption under the criteria governing the uses of moral concepts, but by a method of inquiry analogous to that of scientific inquiry involving the use of hypothesis. The author acknowledges his debt to Arthur Prior, J. Kovesi, and M. Polanyi. The book is good in raising questions on the relation between moral inquiry and scientific inquiry, the significance of the open texture of moral terms and its relation to ethical argumentation, and the problem of reconciling differences of moral beliefs in the setting of their connection with nonmoral beliefs.—A. S. C. (shrink)

This interesting and original essay deals with the sense in which the self is a problem, i.e. the sense in which the self poses a problem. The central thesis is carefully argued: "that if there is a problem of the self, its solution is that self is a problem." Central to the thesis is the distinction between persons and selves. The concept of a person is in Heideggerian terms "ontic" in the sense that it does not arise from any theoretical (...) concern. The concept of self is an "ontological" one. Chapter one argues for the assumption that "persons can be generally inconsistent" and for the distinction between computers and persons. In Chapter two, "the self" is defined as "the locus of the inconsistency." The remaining essays deal with the problems of identity, immortality, consciousness and the pivotal role of the self in philosophical controversy. The book is clearly written and its thesis is carefully supported by arguments. It is an original contribution to the philosophy of mind.--A. S. C. (shrink)

A welcome reprint of a classical study in the theory of value first published in 1958. This, a comprehensive empirical study of values, culminates in the pivotal concept of selective system that "first came to light in the description of the purposive act." A descriptive definition of a selective system is offered after a detailed and painstaking examination of sources of value. "A selective system is a structural process by which a unitary dynamic agency is channeled in such a way (...) that it generates particular acts, dispositions, or objects, and also activates a specific selective agency by which some of the trials are rejected and others are incorporated into the dynamic operation of the system." Selective systems are viewed as natural norms. The ethical import of selective systems is argued in Ethics published in 1960. In terms of Pepper's development of a world hypothesis, The Sources of Value occupies a unique place in his philosophical enterprise. In Concept and Quality, a sequel to World Hypotheses and a discussion and formulation of a new world hypothesis called "Selectivism," the whole analysis in The Sources of Value provides the root metaphor.--A. S. C. (shrink)

This work belongs to what Adam Smith called "the theory of moral sentiments," in particular, it is concerned with the operation of sympathetic affections, which are termed "vicarious affects"; and their rationality and legitimate role in moral theory. Professor Rescher forcefully argues for the thesis that the crucial aspect of vicarious affects lies in their function as motivational factor or reason rather than as a cause of personal conduct. A formal machinery is proposed for the quantitative aspect of the workings (...) of vicarious affects and applied to the problem of the "prisoner’s dilemma." In the latter connection, Rescher shows with insight that there is really nothing paradoxical about the "prisoner’s dilemma." The apparent paradox arises only because the game theorist failed to distinguish sharply rationality and prudence. "It is a travesty... to construe rationality in terms of prudential self-advantage, for there is nothing in any way inherently unreasonable or irrational about a concern for others." "There is no reason why ’self-interest’ should not be construed in an enlightened and widened sense to include the interests of others, through the operation of the vicarious affects." Rescher also points out that there are two alternatives, other than prudence, to the "solution" of conflict interaction situations, i.e., negotiation and impartial arbitration, when both are construed as tacit rather than explicit processes. One chapter is devoted to a fuller analysis and defense of the "impartial arbiter" approach as superior to the negotiation approach, and followed by a sustained critique of utilitarian doctrine of morality. Complex distinctions and arguments are set forth. The fatal weakness of utilitarianism, of various versions, is said to lie in its failure to distinguish de facto utilities and de jure utilities. De jure utilities have rational warrant "exterior to the utilitarian perspective." "An evaluative assessment of the means by which such legitimate human ends as welfare requires the background of a larger vision of the ends of man." The final chapter elaborates this vision as Hegelian in character. While the gap between morality and self-interest is recognized, Rescher postulates as a regulative ideal "a reciprocal coordination of personal and social advantage." But this larger vision includes welfare-transcending considerations, e.g., the various ideals of the quality of life, those "higher" aspirations. "Excellence, dignity, and the sense of worth are its leading themes." In the Primacy of Practice, one finds a fuller discussion of moral excellence, but on the whole Rescher has not offered us a detailed account of this ideal dimension of morality. For the present work, at any rate, Rescher has succeeded in arguing for the significant role of vicarious affects in moral philosophy and its implication for the legitimacy of differential treatments based on personal relationships. It is hoped that, in some future work, Professor Rescher will systematically integrate this role of vicarious affects in an ideal moral theory.—A.S.C. (shrink)

This is a sustained attack on what the author termed "decido-phobia"—the fear of making fateful decisions. The book begins with an illuminating discussion of ten popular strategies of decido-phobia. Of particular interest to moral philosophy is the attack on "moral rationalism" which "claims that purely rational procedures can show what one ought to do or what would constitute a just society". "Moral irrationalism" is also criticized for ignoring the relevance of reasons "when one is confronted with fateful decision". An ethics (...) of autonomous men is proposed as an alternative to decido-phobia. This ethics involves four cardinal virtues of love, honesty, courage, and "humbition," the last a new coinage for "fusion of ambition and honesty." Both the concepts of justice and guilt are subjected to detailed criticism, since they constitute the chief obstacles on the road to autonomy. Unlike Kantian autonomy, Professor Kaufmann focuses on that which "consists of making with open eyes the decisions that give shape to one’s life". There is no need of Kantian maxims or categorical imperative. Autonomy involves a new integrity or high standards of honesty which consist in a sort of lived intellectual honesty that is characteristic of a mind that is open to alternatives and spirit of questions. Alienation is regarded as a price of autonomy. A searching critique of current conceptions of alienation is given in Chapter 6. The author recommends a creative autonomous way of life. In his concluding words "guilt is mired in the past, as is retributive justice. Distributive justice is struck in the present, but by the time it has figured out how to cope with that, it is dated. We must move beyond guilt and justice. We must give up the pleasant notion that we can have all good things at once. What is best is not things at all but creative autonomy". This is an important theme and requires closer scrutiny of its central arguments and its suggested alternative ethics of creative autonomy.—A.S.C. (shrink)

"One basic and underlying assumption of this investigation will be that there is a distinct continuity and development in Berkeley's thought which can be traced through all of his reflective analyses of the problem of perception." The essay argues for Berkeley's theory of perception as a "prototype of the phenomenalists." It argues also for Berkeley's incorporation of elements from the representative theory of perception. Of special interest is the treatment of Berkeley's doctrine of "suggestion" and its connection with the role (...) of imagination in the perception of physical objects. The linguistic aspect of Berkeley's work is minimized. Berkeley's theory of notions receives only a passing reference. The last third of the book is a clear and useful discussion of Berkeley and contemporary phenomenalism. It is suggested, though not shown, that Berkeley has affinity with contemporary phenomenology of perception.--A. S. C. (shrink)

An able and clear defense of Bradley's principal theses and the underlying conception of metaphysical enterprise. "This is a book about a metaphysician, about metaphysics, and, most importantly, it attempts to develop elements of a metaphysical position long the lines of what is called Absolute Idealism." The Introduction takes up the Verificationists [[sic]] argument and two recent accounts of metaphysics. Part I devotes ten Chapters to the elucidation and defense of Bradley's conception of reality. It culminates in examining three alternative (...) accounts of "Real". Part II considers "the major philosophical theories of the self in order to defend Bradley's Theory of the self within his metaphysical scheme."--A. S. C. (shrink)

This book is a sustained criticism of John Rawls’ comprehensive work on the theory of justice. While recognizing the significant contribution of Rawls to both ethics and social theory in articulating clearly a distinct and coherent version of liberalism, Barry believes that "Rawls’ theory does not work and that many of his individual arguments are unsound." In the introductory chapter, the author gives an illuminating comparison of Rawls’ work with Henry Sedgwick’s Methods of Ethics. Throughout the book, critical references have (...) been made to Rawls’ views expressed in the earlier papers. Critical attention is given to the notions of the original position, primary goods, and the thin theory of the good and their relation to Rawls’ contractarian principles of justice. (shrink)

This is a critical edition of the work published in 1681, two years after Hobbes' death. The dialogue contains mature reflections of Hobbes on the doctrine of sovereignty. It deals with the relation between law and reason, sovereign power, crimes, heresies and punishments. The editor's introduction sets forth arguments for regarding the text as a complete work, contrary to the views of L. Stephen, Tönnies, and Robertson. A critical analysis of the argument in the dialogue is also provided indicating the (...) relation of the dialogue to Hobbes' political philosophy. The dialogue is interesting in portraying the more "liberal" side of Hobbes. It is an invaluable aid to the study of Hobbes.--A. S. C. (shrink)

This is perhaps the most original and important treatise on moral philosophy since the publication of Rawls’s Theory of Justice. It commands attention both in terms of its comprehensive scope and argumentative rigor in attempting to offer a theory of moral justification by way of establishing a supreme principle of morality through an analysis of the concept of action and the application of reason to action. The main thesis is "that every agent by the fact of engaging in action, is (...) logically committed to the acceptance of certain evaluative and deontic judgments and ultimately of a supreme moral principle, the Principle of Generic Consistency, which requires that he respect his recipients’ necessary conditions of action. To prove this thesis, I have argued that the very possibility of rational interpersonal action depends upon the adherence to the morality that is grounded in this principle." The book contains five lengthy chapters. The first three chapters set forth the theoretical phase of the work; the last two concern the direct and indirect applications of the Principle of Generic Consistency. (shrink)

This is a comprehensive investigation of the foundations of value theory. It is a survey of some two or three thousand appraisive concepts in the English language, partly "in order to show that ethics and value theory are but stunted growths if they try to confine their attention merely to the vocabulary of general or ultimate appraisives: good, bad, right, wrong". The book contains three parts. Part I deals with Procedures of Appraisal and Judgment, i.e., with the capacities of the (...) mind to respond or react appetitively or emotionally to the environment. Five topics are examined: enjoyment, response, appraisal, enactment, and moral involvement. (shrink)

This work attempts to develop a workable formal theory of coherence that avoids the objections traditionally advanced against the earliest versions of the theory. Basically it construes the coherence theory as a criterial rather than definitional approach to truth, i.e., as furnishing a criterion rather than a definition of truth. The problem of criterion is seen as a problem not of guaranteeing but of authorizing criterion. Coherence is a criterion applying to a set of propositions that satisfies the conditions of (...) consistency and connectiveness of the systemic sort. A detailed logical machinery is developed. The pivotal concept is the notion of data as a truth-candidate, "a proposition to be taken not as true, but as potentially or presumptively true.". (shrink)

The present essay attempts to establish a naturalistic theory for the pursuit of ideals. It is argued that "the necessary condition for the fulfillment of human life" lies in the pursuit of science, morality, and art. After setting forth the view of man as a product of nature with characteristic traits of symbolic response, plasticity of drives, consciousness, and self as a personality, a general chapter is devoted to the discussion of ideals. On this theme, Krikorian expounds a "contextualistic naturalistic" (...) thesis that regards "ideals as natural aspirations that function in a variety of contexts." The crucial question deals with the criteria for evaluating competing ideals. Four criteria are suggested: 1) "firm roots in human nature," 2) universality of scope, 3) personal appeal, and 4) the pragmatic test or "persistence through time." It is not clear how these alleged criteria can yield rational comparative evaluation, since no careful exposition or arguments are offered for the acceptability of these criteria. (shrink)

This is a comprehensive and appreciative account of Dewey’s philosophy of value. It succeeds in rectifying certain current misconceptions of Dewey’s aims and contributions to moral philosophy, and in clearly presenting a coherent theory of value. Gouinlock begins his account by laying stress upon Dewey’s Experience and Nature as a key to Dewey’s thought. Chapter 1 is devoted to this task. It is held that "Dewey develops and articulates an inclusive philosophy by characterizing such things as art, science, and value (...) with a common set of concepts denoting the generic traits of experience." There is also a discussion of Dewey’s philosophic method and the uses and abuses of experience. Chapter 2 deals with man and nature and Dewey’s critical response to bifurcation between mind and body, and the relation between individual and society. Chapter 3 begins with Nature and Value. Here one finds a good discussion of ends-in-view and values. A great stress is laid on Dewey’s use of metaphysical concepts in value analysis, in particular the needed stress on the inclusive unity of means and end. (shrink)

This book is another work on the voluminous literature on the Private Language Argument. The author devotes his arguments solely to a refutation of "anti-private language thesis" as it appears in the articles of N. Malcolm, J. D. Carney, and Newton Garver. Two arguments of the thesis are considered without ascription to Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations. The first is the familiar "The Diary Keeper Argument" found in Wittgenstein : "The claim that the supposition that one could keep a record of a (...) particular kind of sensation having no publicly observable behavioral or circumstantial indicators is unintelligible". Smerud’s attack on this argument in part relies on Ayer’s paper "Can There Be a Private Language?" on the issue of recognition. For the issue on the criterion requirement, Smerud appealed to J. J. Thomson’s paper "Private Languages" as a basis for argument. No note is taken of the criticism of the relevance of verification principle to the issue in D. Locke’s Myself and Others. (shrink)

An able and clear defense of Bradley's principal theses and the underlying conception of metaphysical enterprise. "This is a book about a metaphysician, about metaphysics, and, most importantly, it attempts to develop elements of a metaphysical position long the lines of what is called Absolute Idealism." The Introduction takes up the Verificationists [[sic]] argument and two recent accounts of metaphysics. Part I devotes ten Chapters to the elucidation and defense of Bradley's conception of reality. It culminates in examining three alternative (...) accounts of "Real". Part II considers "the major philosophical theories of the self in order to defend Bradley's Theory of the self within his metaphysical scheme."--A. S. C. (shrink)

A clearly written book that purports to analyze "the ends men pursue, and the ways in which these ends are ordered in some kind of system." The driving force behind the analysis is the attempt to present ends, or at least some important ends, as complex entities having a discernible and significant structure, and then to present the priorities, preferences, and relationships that men impose on their ends as themselves constituting a complex, coherent structure, whose principles of ordering may be (...) discerned and criticized. Part one deals with the structure and ordering of ends and reflects the influence of Kant and Rawls. Part two deals with rational ends and social structures, and part three with life and death as values. Of great practical interest are certain concepts such as life plan and budget risk in dealing with the problems of life and death. The book repays careful study.--A. S. C. (shrink)

The aim "has been to provide the general reader with a reliable and trustworthy account of the life, teaching and influence of Confucius and to show how a man, comparatively insignificant and obscure in his own day, came to occupy a supreme place as the Great and Revered Teacher of the Chinese people." This aim is admirably fulfilled in this sympathetic study of the roots and history of Confucian civilization and its continuing revival of interest, both in the mainland and (...) in areas of Chinese Dispersion, in Taiwan, Singapore, and Hong Kong. Part I gives a good account of the "unique and distinctive place given to Confucius, the founder of one of the world’s greatest systems of religion and philosophical thought." A persuasive case is offered for the defense of the religious dimension of Confucian thought, though its content is essentially ethical. Professor Smith has, in the main, succeeded in conveying the Confucian religious attitude. Part II devotes to a discussion of Confucian civilization from the triumph of Confucianism in the Han Dynasty, and its role until the founding of the Republic of China in 1911. It deals with the development of Neo-Confucian systems and the state cult. A great emphasis is placed on the process that led to the apex of the Confucian civilization in the Manchu Dynasty. The book concludes with an assessment of Confucius: "The great ideals of individual perfection and a harmonious social order which Confucius inculcated are as relevant in the modern world as they were nearly 2500 years ago.... He retains his place, and will still retain his place among the wise ones of the earth who sought after righteousness and found it a thing of great price. Confucius is China’s greatest gift to mankind." The book is a contribution to contemporary reassessment of Confucian thought.—A. S. C. (shrink)

This is a challenging and original work on the concept of justification and its application to ethical statements. The book divides into two parts. The first part is devoted to a systematic treatment of the nature of justification. It begins with a critical rejection of the deductive model. Wellman presents plausible arguments for the existence of non-deductive evidences in ethics and shows how ethical theories can be tested by "thought-experiment" as analogous to the confirmation of scientific theories by laboratory trials. (...) An interesting kind of inference termed "conductive reasoning" is described. It is argued that this third form of reasoning can be validly used in justifying ethical conclusions. Distinctive of conductive reasoning is its non-formal and inconclusive feature. Its validity is alleged to lie in its dependence upon the content of the argument. But by and large there is no way to judge the validity of these basic ethical arguments but by thinking them through and feeling their logical force." Wellman goes on to develop a challenge-response model for understanding the nature of justification. Justification is "to be understood essentially as a process of responding to challenges made." However, Wellman makes no attempt to consider the role of moral concepts in determining the validity of conductive reasoning and its role in the justification of ethical statements. Part II considers the dimensions of ethical justification in terms of the model of challenge and response. Seven species of challenge are described: truth, truth-value, meaningfulness, validity, validity-value, competence, and knowability. On the whole the book contains challenging views and material for the epistemology of ethics.--A. S. C. (shrink)

This is an excellent compilation of essays honoring the seventieth birthday of Joseph Needham. Sivin’s preface plausibly argues for the thesis that, "since the theoretical and practical approaches seem in traditional societies everywhere to have formed a unity with the social, political, and spiritual aspects of life, the reader can enrich his understanding of the latter to the extent that he is aware of the former". The essays belong to two complementary parts. The first four essays by Derek J. de (...) Solla Price, S. Nakayama, A. C. Graham, and Mitukuni Yosida furnish valuable critical aids and perspectives on Needham’s monumental work, Science and Civilization in China. The first three essays contain matters of philosophical interest. The remaining five essays display a variety of representative approaches to Chinese science in the areas of astronomy, Mohist optics, elixir plants, medicine and anesthesia in China and Japan. (shrink)

The fourth publication of the monograph series of the Society for Asian and Comparative Philosophy, this lengthy letter of Leibniz on Chinese philosophy is an important contribution to East-West philosophical dialogue, for it depicts a sympathetic yet critical assessment of Chinese philosophy on the basis of translations and secondary sources available to Leibniz. Leibniz’s interest, as the translators point out, was not merely ecumenical, but an expression of high regard for the intrinsic contributions of Chinese thought. In spite of mistakes (...) in chronology, authorship, and interpretation of key notions of Chinese philosophy, Leibniz’s letter is important in the use of philosophical argumentation in the rebuttal of the historical and theological arguments given by Antonio Caballero a Santa Maria and Nicholas Longobardi who opposed the accommodationist position of Matteo Ricci. Leibniz’s letter cannot be regarded as a good guide to Chinese philosophy. But it has a place in the history of East-West philosophy in exemplifying the commendable attitude that combines serious appreciation and critical assessment. The translators have provided an excellent introductory guide to this Discourse. The explanatory notes and comments are quite helpful to the readers. An appendix on "Variant Readings of the Text" and a good bibliography are also provided.—A.S.C. (shrink)

This book is an anthology of essays dealing with the problem of the justification of claims to factual knowledge of various sorts. All, except one excerpted from a book, were originally journal articles. Part one, contains essays by R. F. Holland, William Earle, and E. J. Furlong on the problem of memory. Part two, contains essays by A. J. Ayer, C. H. Whiteley, and H. H. Price. Part three contains essays by Ayer, R. J. Hirst, and C. H. Whiteley. A (...) general introduction precedes the essays. A useful bibliographical essay is also given.--A. S. C. (shrink)

These volumes provide a large introduction to the works of modern value theory from their beginnings in J. Bentham, F. Nietzsche, and H. Lotze to the more recent Anglo-American studies. Volume I is concerned with "the German-Language Group." Extensive discussion is devoted to the views of F. Brentano, A. Meinong, C. von Ehrenfels, J. C. Kreibig, E. Heyde, H. Rickert, H. Münsterberg, M. Scheler, K. Wiederhold, W. Stern, F. Wilken, M. Beck, and V. Krafts. It provides a good conspectus of (...) varieties of nineteenth century value theories. The author aims at an exposition rather than critical treatment of the various philosophers. Each chapter contains a useful bibliography. Of more contemporary interest is Volume II which deals with the Anglo-American Group. One finds here a detailed presentation of the theories of W. M. Urban, J. Dewey, B. Bosanquet, D. Prall, C. G. Shaw, R. B. Perry, D. H. Parkel, W. Stern, A. C. Garnett, J. N. Findlay, E. Brightman, B. E. Jessup, C. I. Lewis, R. Lepley, S. C. Pepper, Everett Hall, R. Hartman, and W. D. Lamont. Shorter discussions deal with works of A. L. Hillard, E. M. Adams, and K. Aschenbrenner. Liberal quotations from original sources are interspersed throughout the exposition. The clarification of issues is not always successful. The author does provide a good focus, however, for important passages from the works discussed. Regrettably, one finds an omission of the view of David Pole, the absence of a summary section on each theory discussed, and the absence of an index. Nevertheless, the students of value theory can find in this work a useful tool of research. The comprehensive scope provides a rich variety of contributions to the important field of value theory.—A.S.C. (shrink)

An account and development of Arthur Murphy's Theory of Practical Reason and its application to contemporary moral problems. Chapter II gives a schematic account of Murphy's theory of normative discourse. Chapter III contrasts this theory with other theories and approaches. The author justly remarks that "Murphy's intent has been primarily to restore proper balance among considerations that play a role in practical discourse and to steer clear of the pitfalls which would impair or diminish the effectiveness of reason in human (...) actions." Chapter IV deals with "the contemporary erosion of practical reason and critique of existentialistic [[sic]] ethics." Chapter V contains an interesting discussion of Murphy's conception of developing and dynamic self as responsible agent. It gives recognition to the moral self as basic condition that underlies the activity of practical justification. The final chapter undertakes practical applications of the theory expounded. The monograph is a good exposition and defense of Murphy's important contribution to contemporary moral philosophy.--A. S. C. (shrink)

This book is an excellent collection of papers which partly spring from, and partly bear on the Study Group on the Unity of Knowledge held in various universities, October, 1967-March, 1970. The papers all bear on the problem of reduction. In "Unity of Physical Law and Levels of Description," Ilya Prigogine argues that organized structures need physical laws of organization, not of entropy only, to explain their genesis and operation." The editor’s paper, "Reducibility: Another Side Issue," argues, following Polanyi, that (...) living things as machines already transcend physics, since they demand both chemical and engineering principles for their explanation." "How is Mechanism Conceivable?" points out that ordinary ways of talking about and explaining behavior, i.e., as involving intention and purpose, differs in logic from mechanistic explanation. But this difference in logic of the two languages is "never an obstacle to the reduction of one theory to another, indeed, there is always such a noncongruence of the conceptual mesh." Anthony J. P. Kenny’s "The Homunculus Fallacy" argues against "the reckless application of human-being predicates to insufficiently human-like objects." In "Behavior, Belief, and Emotion," A. C. MacIntyre argues for the thesis that "there is no necessary connection between at least some emotions and particular forms of behavior." In "The Critique of Artificial Reason," H. Dreyfus criticizes both the empirical and a priori arguments for optimism underlying the work in artificial intelligence. It displays the underlying philosophical assumption inherent in Western philosophical tradition since Plato. The last two papers concern Polanyi’s theory of knowledge. In "Tacit Knowledge and the Concept of Mind," W. T. Scott shows how Ryle’s "Concept of Mind can be significantly extended by considering certain features of the philosophical position that Michael Polanyi has developed around the concept of tacit knowing." R. S. Cohen’s "Tacit, Social and Hopeful" discusses the difficulties in Polanyi’s epistemology and the merits of the logical reconstruction work in science. Only the papers by Dreyfus and Scott have been previously published. Throughout the collection, the editor has provided useful introductory remarks focusing upon the unifying themes in the collection.—A. S. C. (shrink)

A welcome reprint of an important work of Hutcheson with an excellent philosophical and scholarly study of the issues between Hutcheson and the rationalist Gilbert Burnet in respect to the former's contributions to metaethics. The study, modestly entitled "Editor's Introduction" is a philosophical contribution to the study of the Moral Sense Theory which argues forcibly for the plausibility of Hutcheson's epistemology of morals as a form of non-cognitivism that recognizes the proper role of reason. Peach adopts a defeasibility interpretation of (...) Hutcheson's Moral Theory. Unlike the principle of Benevolence, which is a moral principle, "the principle of approval is primarily descriptive and psychological." It is maintained that the vindication of Hutcheson's theory appeals to "the concept of a way of life in which the satisfaction of examined desires is maximized, to the concept of the kind of person, all things considered, one wants to be." Professor Peach's challenging interpretation is worthy of careful study. The appendix reprints the correspondence between Gilbert Burnet and Francis Hutcheson.--A. S. C. (shrink)

This anthology consists of a wealth of selections from pre-Confucian literature to Han Fei Tzu’s legalistic writings. Ample space is given to pre-Confucian classes to display the background of Confucius and Chinese philosophical thought. The selections are made from the point of view of a political philosopher. Major thinkers are well represented. Each selection is preceded by a brief general introduction. The editor succeeds well in presenting the spectrum and rich variety of classical Chinese philosophy. Explanatory notes are on the (...) whole quite helpful to students, so also is the bibliography for further readings. For the students of Chinese philosophy, however, this anthology is no substitute for W. T. Chan’s Source Book in Chinese Philosophy. For students of political thought this anthology could increase its value had the editor written a longer introduction dealing with the intimate connection of Chinese ethics and politics and the underlying conception of man in relation to the cosmos.—A.S.C. (shrink)

This book is a collection of five studies, four of which have not been previously published. The first is a reprint of Professor Bernard Williams’ inaugural lecture at Bedford College in May, 1965. In "Morality and the Emotions," Williams points to the neglect of emotions in recent British moral philosophy due to the preoccupation with fact-value distinction and an immersion in "a deeply Kantian view of morality". A reassessment of the contribution of emotivism is made. The suggestion is that in (...) some cases, "the relevant unity in a man’s behaviour, the pattern into which his judgments and actions together fit, must be understood in terms of an emotional structure underlying them, and that understanding of this kind may be essential". There follows a criticism of Kant on emotions. The second essay, "Attitudes, Beliefs, and Reasons," by R. Scruton addresses to the question of "What is the nature of a moral belief?" by considering the naturalistic and emotive answers and offering arguments in favor of the latter. This is a monographic essay that deals with a range of issues in recent moral philosophy. The suggested analysis of "attitude" in terms of two necessary conditions gives plausibility of a new defense of emotive theory. Regarding objectivity of moral judgments, Scruton suggests that this notion be regarded as "indefinite suspended subjectivity" which in some way parallels C. Wellman’s Challenge and Response. (shrink)